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Abstract This paper analyzes governance choice in a two-level federation in providing road
infrastructure across jurisdictions. Two models are proposed to predict the choice of central-
ized or decentralized spending structure on a serial road network shared by two districts.
While the ﬁrst model considers simple Pigouvian behavior of governments, the second ex-
plicitly models political forces at both a local and central level. Both models led to the
conclusions that the spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory comprise between
beneﬁts and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes, and that gover-
nance choice may spontaneously shift as the infrastructure improves temporally.
Keywords Governance choice · Transportation · Infrastructure · Fiscal federalism
1 Introduction
It has long been observed that the development of transportation systems has been charac-
terized by “a constantly shifting mix of private enterprise, on the one hand, and government
initiatives at local, state, and national levels, on the other hand” (Taaffe et al. 1996). The
shift between alternative ownership structures and regulatory regimes has profoundly inﬂu-
enced the provision of transportation infrastructure, both in the policy-making process, basic
ﬁnancing, and in the shaping of speciﬁc routes and network patterns.1
1Transportation economists have long been investigating the issues of transportation ﬁnancing under alter-
native pricing and regulatory regimes. Quantitatively, they have approached the issue from both a theoretical
and empirical perspective. Theoretical exploration primarily focuses on the endogenous choices of prices,
investment, and ownership in classic small networks with one Origin–Destination pair and two or more
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Fig. 1 Total receipts from gasoline and other road taxes for highways by different government levels during
1945–2002. (Data Source: Federal Highway Administration 2005)
Narrowing our focus to the government provision of transportation infrastructure,2 al-
though the roles of governments at different levels have always been intertwined in reality,
some centralizing tendency to move from local to state to federal levels has been noted when
the major modes of waterways, railways, turnpikes, and roads were deployed in the United
States (Taylor 2004; Garrison and Levinson 2005;B o g a r t2005). For instance, most US
turnpikes were local throughout the nineteenth century, initially organized by larger cities
connecting ports to hinterlands.
As transportation systems developed, however, the roles of the state and federal govern-
ment became more and more prominent. Railway consolidation and regulation, as well as a
revival of inland waterways and certain canals, would not have been possible without gov-
ernment involvement and ﬁnancial aid at the state and federal levels. While the promotion
of road transportation had been primarily at local and state levels during the early twentieth
century, the federal government acquired the major promotional role during the interstate
highway era post-1956. Evidence is available in Fig. 1, which displays the percentage of
total receipts from gasoline and other road taxes for highways by government levels dur-
ing 1945–2002. Over this period, 1956 witnessed a salient increase in the federal share of
alternative routes (Button 1998; de Palma and Lindsey 2000; Verhoef et al. 1996; Verhoef and Rouwendal
2004; Borger et al. 2005; Zhang and Levinson 2007) or with stylized network geometries (Levinson 2002).
Empirical studiesin largepartexplore therelationship betweentheperformance of transportation systems, the
allocation of funds or decision-making power across regulatory hierarchies, and economic and demographic
characteristics of jurisdictions based on cross-jurisdiction statistical analyses (Humplick and Moini-Araghi
1996; Levinson and Yerra 2002)
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highway receipts, immediately following the establishment of the Federal Highway Trust
Fund (HTF) to ﬁnance the construction of the Interstate highway system (McDaniel and
Coley 2004). As infrastructure has aged and congestion grown after the completion of the
Interstate system, the call for better coordination between jurisdictions and departments in-
volved in the management, operations, and expansion of regional road systems has been
growing in intensity. In response to the interconnected and interdependent nature of current
road systems, the establishment of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) and various
Regional Operating Organizations (ROOs) in recent years has marked a shift of institutional
structure of transportation decision making from a local to a regional level (Haynes et al.
2005).
While decision making at a higher government level in a multi-jurisdictional road system
seems to be desirable in terms of better coordination across jurisdictions, it also brings in-
stitutional and political problems that may lead to inequity or economic inefﬁciency. Taking
the US Federal-Aid Highway Program as an example, policy debate has lasted over the past
20 years regarding the distribution of federal highway funding. The controversy arose as
the program’s payment to the individual states did not match the amount of federal high-
way taxes each state’s highway users pay to the Highway Trust Fund, which is commonly
referred to as the “donor–donee” problem (Kirk 2004). Donee states like Alaska have ex-
perienced high returns from the HTF, donor states like California have always contributed
more than they have received, while some states like Ohio have experienced instability and
cycling in terms of their donor/donee status.3 In general, the allocation of federal highway
funds is based on formulas that are biased in favor of states with relatively low highway
use to maintain national integration (Johnson and Libecap 2000). In such an allocatively
imbalanced program, a ﬁscal correspondence problem arises when policy makers in donee
states spend to beneﬁt their constituent travelers and suppliers, but whose welfare costs are
borne by taxpayers in all the states. Regional transportation institutions have their misal-
location problems too. As Haynes et al. (2005) pointed out, MPOs usually adopt the “one
government/one vote” decision structure regardless of the heterogeneous distribution of re-
gional population and transportation demand, which tends to under-represent central cities
and poorer populations, and over-represent suburbs and higher income groups. The legisla-
tive process at the federal level causes additional problems. Politicians form coalitions to
maintain political support and reach policy agreements in Congress, at the obvious cost of
the economic efﬁciency of their policy decisions.4
The purpose of this study, with a particular focus on the public provision of road in-
frastructure, is to examine how transportation policy decisions have been instituted by the
government at various levels, and which level of government would be preferable to deliver
infrastructure projects at a particular stage of transportation development. From an evolu-
tionary perspective, the study also explores why the institutional structure of policy making
has spontaneously shifted during the course of transportation development. This study aims
to shed some light on how regulatory efforts from different government levels, taking into
account their respective pros and cons, could be reconciled in a more effective governance
structure that may provide an efﬁcient, equitable, and sustainable transportation system from
a long-term perspective.
3As Kirk (2004) demonstrated with highway statistics, Ohio has been a donee in six ﬁscal years during the
period of 1981–2002, and a net donor for the other years.
4As Winston (2000) described, “transportation bills are loaded with demonstration or ‘pork barrel’ projects
to ensure passage.”192 Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212
2 Governance choice from a ﬁscal federalism perspective
Toaddresstheissueofhowdecisionpowercouldbeallocatedatdifferentgovernmentlevels,
we must ﬁrst take an in-depth look at a classic question in public economics: in a federation
with two levels of (local vs. central) government, which level provides public goods more
efﬁciently?5 At the heart of this problem is the tradeoff between the advantages and disad-
vantages of alternative regimes in providing public goods. Ignoring the issues of citizens’
mobility across jurisdictions,6 local governments tend to provide public goods to a level that
maximizes the aggregate surplus of their constituents, while neglecting beneﬁts going to
other districts. In the presence of positive spillovers across jurisdictions,7 local governments
will tend to under-provide local public goods. In contrast, a central government may provide
public goods more efﬁciently by internalizing the spillovers across local districts. The inefﬁ-
ciency of centralized decision making, though, is more controversial. The classic decentral-
ization theorem developed by Oates (1972) describes centralized provision of public goods
as a process by which a central government chooses a uniform level of public good for each
district, stressing that a ‘one size ﬁts all’ provision of public goods may fail to reﬂect local
districts’ differentiated preferences on public spending and thus undermine local interests.
The modern literature, however, tends to eliminate the uniformity constraint because it is not
realistic to assume a central government cannot differentiate the levels of spending in dif-
ferent districts. Centralized decision making may have other administrative disadvantages,
such as additional overhead due to increased span of control and informational asymme-
tries associated with local needs. These factors, however, have not been formally modeled
in literature.
In recent years, a rich literature of ﬁscal federalism has explicitly introduced political
economy models to examine how conﬂicting local interests could result in suboptimal pol-
icy decisions in a legislature of locally elected representatives, which gives rise to another
decentralizing force in the classic question of centralized versus decentralized provision of
public goods. The conﬂicts essentially arise from distributive policy-making of a legisla-
ture that provides public goods whose beneﬁts are geographically concentrated but costs
generalized. It is expected that representatives will push for high spending favored by their
jurisdiction but at the expense of other jurisdictions.8
In political science, legislative behavior has been modeled as cooperative or non-
cooperative from different perspectives, which divided the literature into two strands.9 The
5A broad literature of ﬁnancial federalism has addressed this question, with a branch focusing on the discrete
choicebetweencentralizedversusdecentralizedprovisionofgeneralpublicgoods.EppleandNechyba(2004)
has a thorough survey of this literature.
6A branch of literature, dating back to Tiebout (1956), sees the advantage of decentralization as stemming
from the mobility of citizens across local jurisdictions and resultant decentralized policies more closely re-
ﬂecting citizens’ preferences. The advantage of decentralization associated with mobility, however, is not
considered in this study.
7Positive spillovers exist when a public good provided in one district beneﬁts the residents of other districts.
Transportation infrastructure is a public good with positive spillovers. Ignoring tolls across jurisdictions, for
example, outside travelers can use local roads without paying for them, which is referred to as the “free rider”
phenomenon.
8Knight (2003), analyzing 1998 Congressional votes over transportation project funding, provided empiri-
cal evidence that legislators’ probability of supporting a transportation project is increasing in own-district
spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending.
9The models of non-cooperative legislative processes originate from Buchanan and Tullock (1962); Riker
(1962); while the early analytical work of cooperative legislative behavior dates back to Weingast (1979).
Collie (1988) provides a survey of the two different approaches.Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212 193
cooperative view of legislative behavior assumes that representatives may exploit the ben-
eﬁts of universalistic cooperation in the legislature so that legislative policy decisions will
maximize the beneﬁts of all members. Nevertheless, Besley and Coate (2003) showed that
suboptimal policy decisions may still result due to strategic delegation by jurisdictions in the
cooperative legislature. From this standpoint, a series of legislative bargaining models has
been developed to examine the inefﬁciency associated with strategic delegation in the co-
operative legislature from different angles (Cheikbossian 2004; Redoano and Scharf 2004;
Dur and Roelfsema 2005; Lorz and Willmann 2005). The cooperative view, however, ne-
glects the difﬁculty in assembling and maintaining a universalistic coalition when mem-
bers of Congress represent differing and competing demands, and when the number of rep-
resentatives is large. Obviously both situations are not uncommon in multi-jurisdictional
transportation systems. By contrast, a non-cooperative view of legislative behavior assumes
that minimum winning coalitions of representatives will form when legislative decisions
are taken by majority rule. The inefﬁciency of legislative decision-making, as Besley and
Coate (2003) pointed out, thus arises from the uncertainty associated with the identity of
the minimum winning coalition, and the misallocation of resources that takes place when a
non-cooperative coalition makes legislative decisions.
The above economic models of the provision of general public goods, however, are lim-
ited when applied to transportation infrastructure. The limitation is twofold. First, the ﬁs-
cal federalism literature in large part neglects where residents live and where they travel,
therefore providing little insight into the role of spatial and demographic characteristics of
geographically deﬁned districts when investment decisions are made on a transportation in-
frastructure across the districts. For instance, the literature assumes a homogeneous spillover
effect (deﬁned as residents’ preference for public spending in other districts over the spend-
ing in their own district) for simplicity. This assumption, though, is rarely true in the case
of transportation infrastructure. Indeed, individuals’ preferences for spending on transporta-
tion infrastructure in other districts vary by their residential location; so do their preferences
for public spending on transportation over private consumption.10 Spatially differentiated
spending preferences of individual residents may collectively play out in policy decisions
through political processes. The ﬁscal federalism literature, however, has failed to capture
the salient spatial dimension in the provision of transportation infrastructure. Furthermore,
by assuming residents’ spending preferences as exogenous, the existing literature lacks a
dynamic view on the provision of transportation infrastructure. Unlike other public goods,
such as schools and water treatment plants, spending on transportation infrastructure across
districts changes the conditions on which the current spending decisions were made (by
reducing transportation cost within and across districts and thus residents’ preference for
transportation spending), which will in turn affect the spending decisions in the subsequent
period. Keeping in mind the mutual effects between spending decisions of local or central
governments and spending preferences of individual residents, one would expect an evolv-
ing spending pattern in a sequential process of transportation infrastructure provision.
This study presents a spatio-economic analysis that re-addresses the question of which
level (local or central) of government in a two-level federation may provide transporta-
tion infrastructure more efﬁciently, and examines the issue of why a centralizing tendency
10Intuitively, one can imagine that people who drive more on roads would prefer higher public road spend-
ing, and that people who travel more outside their home jurisdiction would prefer higher road spending in
neighboring districts. Further, how much people travel and travel outside their residence district depends on
how far away they live from the destinations of activities located within or outside the district.194 Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212
Fig. 2 Governance choice on
two local districts
has been observed during the development of major transportation modes. While recogniz-
ing the beneﬁts of centralization as improved coordination of interregional spillovers, this
analysis introduces non-cooperative legislative decision processes in centralized provision
of transportation infrastructure which may lead to inefﬁciency associated with uncertainty
or misallocation. Local districts will weigh the beneﬁts of alternative spending structures
against their costs, and collectively decide in an autonomous political process which spend-
ing structure to adopt. This study also explores how the choice of centralized or decentral-
ized spending structure might shift as transportation infrastructure improves and residents’
preferences for spending change.
3 Model setting
To ﬁx ideas, let us consider the following problem. Suppose that a one-dimensional space is
divided into geographically deﬁned districts indexed by i = 1,...,n. A continuum of res-
idents lives on the space. Residents travel to reach their destinations where activities take
place. It is assumed that activities are located only at the centers of districts. As illustrated
in Fig. 2, jurisdictions (districts) build and share a joint road infrastructure throughout the
space which serve residents’ travel needs within and across districts. For simplicity, it is as-
sumed that each district maintains a uniform level of service (operationalized by the average
speed of vehicular travel on roads maintained by each jurisdiction vi, i = 1,...,n)o nt h e
segment of road to its jurisdiction. Congestion is not dealt with in this analysis. Suppose
that the districts initially maintain the same level of service on roads (indicated by v0). In
a decentralized spending structure, local governments or districts independently choose the
level of road spending. In a centralized spending structure, on the other hand, a central gov-
ernment takes over the decision power and determines spending levels for all of the districts.
While the analysis is generalizable to multiple jurisdictions, we further simplify the problem
by adopting a familiar setup in the context of regional public good provision with two iden-
tical districts (indexed by i, j) to avoid redundant calculation and derive spending decisions
in explicit forms. Districts have an equal size of L, represented by the distance between two
boundary points of a jurisdiction. A summary of notation is given in Table 1.
Residents are characterized by the locations of their residence x on the one-dimensional
space (x indicates the relative position from the location of residence to the center of the
residence district). The demand function ρ(x,i) represents the number of trips that an in-
dividual resident living at x makes to reach the activities located at the center of district i.
Extending a double-cost approach,11 the utility of an individual resident takes the following
form:
11An extended double-cost approach is adopted as a measure of performance in Buchanan and Tullock (1962)
and Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996). It accounts for two categories of costs: the ﬁrst is resource costs,
which are simply the costs of provision, administration, and management of roads. In this case, we consider
only the costs of road improvement. And the second is preference costs, which are deﬁned as costs incurred
by road users, in this case the monetary cost of travel time that residents have spent on roads. In line with
economic theory, the objective is set to minimize the total cost, which is the sum of preference costs and





E Road construction cost
f Uniform tax
g,h Derived functions
i,j Indices of two neighboring districts
J Jurisdiction
k Number of trips by an individual resident in a planning
period
L The size of district
M Median voter
n Number of districts
p Planning period
r Residential density
t,T Travel time of individual resident, jurisdiction
u,U Utility of individual resident, collective welfare of
jurisdiction
v0 The initial road speed
vi Updated road speed chosen by district i
x Distance to the center of residence district
α Coefﬁcients in the cost function
β Weight central government puts on different districts
δ Multiplier in the demand function
η Portion of trips going to the center of residence district
λ Measure of spillover effects
ρ Demand function
τ Value of time
θ The decay factor in the demand function
At a local level,
u
D
x =− τtx −f
D (1)
At a central level,
u
C
x =− τtx −f
C (2)
In either case, we assume that a uniform head tax will be charged on residents in order to




D dx≡ Ei(v0,v i) (3)
Under the centralized spending structure, although spending decisions are made at a cen-
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Fig. 3 An illustration of the
endogenous choice of decision
structure in a Pigouvian system
of local governments
In aggregate, the welfare of residents in each district can be represented by:
U
D






Ideally a central government aims to maximize the aggregate welfare of residents treat-
ing districts equally. Conﬂicting interests of local districts, however, may play out in the
legislative decision-making processes and skew road spending across districts. This issue
will be addressed later.
We envisage that spending decisions on roads result from the equilibrium of a two-stage
political game played by jurisdictions. In the ﬁrst stage, elected representatives of districts
will make the choice of policy centralization or decentralization in a representative democ-
racy.12 In a two-district context, a centralized structure is adopted if and only if both districts
choose centralization. In the second stage, spending levels are determined at the center or
in each district. If a centralized structure is adopted, a central government will take over the
decision power and a legislature of locally elected representatives will determine the spend-
ing level in each district; if centralization is vetoed, each district will determine her spending
level independently. Assuming a central government treats two member districts differently
by putting different weights (βi) on the two districts (how the mistreatment could occur will
be explained later), the game is illustrated in Fig. 3. As can be seen, two districts simulta-
neously decide which decision structure they would adopt (“C” represents centralization,
while “D” represents decentralization); then spending decisions (speed levels) are made at
either a central or local level.
12As Redoano and Scharf (2004) pointed out, there are two distinct political procedures for jurisdictions to
determine whether or not to participate in policy coordination agreements. Under a direct democracy, citizens
in each region decide whether or not to centralize by referendum; under a representative democracy, on the
other hand, citizens delegate the decision to elected policy makers. This analysis considers only the latter
system.Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212 197
Solving the game backwards, we ﬁrst discuss spending decisions that will be made in a
centralized versus decentralized structure. We then derive the collective choice of jurisdic-
tions in terms of centralization versus decentralization by evaluating expected beneﬁts and
costs in alternative spending structures.
4 Decisions on road spending
From a normative standpoint, efﬁcient spending decisions should maximize the total welfare
of residents of interest. However, it is not realistic to expect the normative outcome will pre-
vail when spending decisions are made politically. In this section, we start with a normative
analysis which introduces a “Pigouvian” system of governments,13 w h i c hi sf o l l o w e db ya
Citizen-Candidate model in which political procedures are introduced to predict spending
decisions at both a local and central level.
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that residents are uniformly distributed across
space with a density of r. It is further assumed that each individual resident generates the
same number of k trips during a planning period, of which the same portion (η) of trips goes
to the center of the residence district.14 Deﬁning the spillover effect as the ratio of total travel
time one spends in the neighboring district to that in the residence district, the signiﬁcance














v0 )) L/2 ≤ x ≤ L
(7)
Obviously the spillover effect varies by location, which distinguishes this spatio-
economic analysis from traditional discussions in ﬁscal federalism in the context of general
public goods.













where d(x,i) and d(x,j) represent the average distance from a resident in district i to the
centers of district i and district j, respectively. Under the assumption of uniform distribution
13In political economics, there are two extreme models of local government behavior: while the Leviathan
rent maximizing model assumes an extremely selﬁsh government which seeks to maximize its own revenue,
in a Pigouvian model a government represents the interests of local residents and seeks to maximize the local
welfare of its population. See Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a detailed explanation.
14The assumption of homogeneous travel demand on space, while to some extent simplifying reality, allows
us to derive closed-form spending decisions analytically. Nevertheless, heterogeneity among residents is par-
tially captured by their differentiated spatial locations of residence and accordingly varying travel distances
to reach activities.198 Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212







The above equation deﬁnes an inverse relationship between the in-district travel demand
and the service level (speed) of the road infrastructure. When the speed is close to zero,
indicating virtual isolation between the two districts, all trips are destined for the center
of the home district (η = 1). When the speed increases to inﬁnity, the two destinations are
indifferent to any resident (η = 0.5). With an improving road speed during transportation
development, we expect to see η dropping from 1 to 0.5.
In addition, we specify a Cobb–Douglas type of cost function on road investment as
follows:





Over small increments in road speed, it can be approximated as:




With this, we ﬁnally have all the ingredients needed to derive the spending decisions
made at a local or central level.
4.1 Pigouvian governments model
Under decentralized decision-making, benevolent local governments independently select
the levels of road spending (represented by the improved road speed vi) to maximize the







ing for each district to maximize the aggregate welfare of both districts while its preference







If the central executive treats the beneﬁt of each district equally, as Oates (1972) has al-
ready shown, centralized decision-making always will be superior to decentralized decision-
making with the presence of positive interregional spillovers across districts and no disec-
onomies of scale. In reality, however, the central executive’s spending decisions may be
skewed as an outcome of political conﬂicts in legislative policy-making processes.15 Defer-
ring the discussion of legislative behavior to the next section, this model assumes a central












15For instance, Cheikbossian (2004), assuming the central government is maximizing the weighted sum of
the welfare of local regions, showed that the respective weight of each locality is determined by its lobbying




βi = 1 (16)
Weights speciﬁed here (βi) can be viewed as exogenous and known to districts at this
stage of the game, although they are endogenously determined when the spending structure
is chosen, as explained in the next section too.
Following a step-by-step procedure in the Appendix, the Nash-equilibrium roadspending




















The Pigouvian Governments model does not explicitly consider the political forces that may
inﬂuence road spending decisions at a local or central level. In a representative democracy,
residentsineachdistrictcanvoteforrepresentatives accordingtotheirspendingpreferences,
and delegate their spending decision to the elected representatives;16 at a central level, a leg-
islature constituted by locally elected representatives makes spending decisions for districts.
Under decentralized decision making, residents vote for the spending level in their resi-
dence district to maximize their individual utilities. The preference of an individual resident








With majority rule and two competing political parties, it is suggested in the “median
voter theorem” (Downs 1957) that the elected representative commits to a policy position
preferred by the median-type voter. In this analysis, as spending preferences of individual
residents vary by their residence locations, we need to ﬁnd the location(s) xM
i where the
median voter(s) live in order to predict the spending decision made by elected candidates.
Under centralized decision making, locally elected representatives form a legislature to
determine road spending policies. From different perspectives, the legislature could be either
cooperative or non-cooperative in nature. Extending Besley and Coate (2003), this analysis
assumes a non-cooperative legislature in which representatives from each district form a
coalition that commits to the same policy position. Each coalition could be thought of as a
minimum winning coalition in the legislature while it is uncertain which coalition will be
selected to determine spending policies. To simplify, it is assumed that each district elects
one single representative that represents the minimum winning coalition of local represen-
tatives. In the case of two identical districts, it is further assumed that either representative
has a chance to be selected as policy-maker in the legislature with equal probability.
16It is assumed in this analysis that all the residents have the right to vote as a citizen.200 Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212
When the representative from district i is selected to determine the spending policy, the















Following the procedure described in the Appendix, we found that a median voter may
live in either half of a district. The distance from the location of the median voter to the











+ indicates the location of the median voter living closer to the neighboring
district; while xM
− indicates the location farther from the neighboring district. Interestingly,
the location of the median voter (and accordingly the local spending decision) depends on
travel demand. As can be seen, when residents travel more frequently across the border
(indicated by a smaller value of η), the median voter lives closer to the border.
Accordingly, the road spending level chosen through decentralized decision making is
























As compared to the local spending levels determined by Pigouvian local governments
s h o w ni n( 17), we can see that the election has led to suboptimal road spending at a local
level due to competition between political parties.
Under centralized decision making, on the other hand, suppose that the minimum win-
ning coalition from district i wins the majority and takes over power in the legislature,





   
















5 Choice of spending structure
With predicted spending decisions at local and central levels, representatives of each dis-
trict choose the spending structure favored by their home district by comparing the expectedPublic Choice (2009) 141: 189–212 201
beneﬁts associated with centralization versus decentralization, while the ﬁnal choice is made
collectively. In the case of two districts, the Nash-equilibrium condition under which a cen-










As shown in the Appendix, if it is assumed in the Pigouvian Governments model that the
spending policies at a central level are skewed against district i (i.e., 0 ≤ βi ≤ 0.5) without
loss of generality, the equilibrium condition can be derived in a reduced form that reads:
g(η,βi) ≤ 0, (27)
where the explicit form of g(η,βi) can be found in the Appendix.
It is worth noting that, the Ultimatum Game17 provides insight into how the value of βi
could be endogenously determined when spending structure is chosen: the central govern-
ment makes an offer (denoted by βi,0≤ βi ≤ 0.5) to the disfavored local government (as
the favored local government will always vote for centralization) and the local government
can either accept this offer (by voting for centralization) or decline it (by voting against cen-
tralization). Empirical results suggest that a fair offer (a 50/50 split) will usually be made
in a Ultimatum Game,18 while a unfair split that is less than 20% will always be declined
(Henrich et al. 2004; Oosterbeek et al. 2004). Within this range the split may vary by the
cultural and social nature of players.19
In the Citizen-Candidate model the equilibrium condition was derived as:
h(η) ≤ 0 (28)
The explicit form of h(η) can also be found in the Appendix.
The analysis has to this point focused on the choice of the spending structure in a static
context with an exogenous road service level (represented by v0). From an evolutionary
perspective, the spending structure for a transportation system may shift as the infrastructure
improves over time. When the system is in its birth phase, decentralization is favored as
transportation cost is high and spillover effects are insigniﬁcant. When the infrastructure
improves and travel costs are reduced, residents travel across borders at a higher frequency,
leading to an increasing need to better address the issue of spillovers or free riders. When the
need becomes prominent enough to overcome the inefﬁciency of centralization associated
with legislative policy-making processes, districts will eventually switch to the centralized
spending structure. This idea is illustrated numerically as follows.
In the Pigouvian Governments model, whether or not a centralized structure will be
adopted, is determined by g(η,βi) where 0.5 ≤ η ≤ 1a n d0≤ βi ≤ 0.5. We constructed
17First studied by Güth et al. (1982), the Ultimatum Game is a bargaining game in which two players decide
how to divide a sum of money: while the ﬁrst player proposes a division of the money, the second player
decideswhethertoacceptit.Ifaccepted,playersgettheiragreeduponshares;ifrejected,bothreceivenothing.
18The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), for example, provided a minimum guarantee
program which ensures the return of highway funding to each state is no less than 90.5% of the state’s tax
payment to the Highway Trust Fund (Kirk 2004). This could be translated, in our case of two identical
jurisdictions, into a Ultimatum offer of 50% with limited instability.
19Our model is different from the Ultimatum Game in that the disfavored local government will get more than
nothing when rejecting the offer and going for decentralization. So the central government needs to make an
even higher offer (βi) to reach an agreement than if in the Ultimatum Game.202 Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212
Fig. 4 A numeric illustration of the endogenous choice of decision structure with the change in η and βi
in the Pigouvian Governments model. A negative value of g(η,βi) indicates the adoption of a centralized
structure
a numerical example to obtain perspective on the relationship between the choice of spend-
ing structure and the relative own-district demand (η), as well as the central government’s
spending preference (βi). In doing so, we calculated g(η,βi) for each pair of η (0.5 ≤ η ≤ 1)
and β (0≤ βi ≤ 0.5)values with an interval of 0.01.The change in g(η,βi) isplotted against
βi and η in Fig. 4. Note that centralization is adopted only if the governance choice func-
tion g(η,βi) has a negative value. Northeast corner of the graph, for instance, represents
values of g less than 0, therefore favoring centralization. Note also that the equity factor
β represents the relative weight that the central government puts on the unfavorable local
jurisdiction. A beta value closer to 0.5 indicates a more equitable treatment of local inter-
ests under centralization. The spillover factor η denotes the portion of trips destined for the
center of home district. A smaller η indicates a more signiﬁcant spillover effect, as more
trips are crossing the border between districts. As can be seen in the graph, when β = 0.5,
meaning the central government treats two member districts equally, a centralized spending
structure is always adopted as centralized decision making outperforms decentralization by
internalizing the spillovers across jurisdictions. When βi = 0, on the other extreme, cen-
tralization is never adopted as the beneﬁts of district i would be completely ignored by the
central executive. The reality, however, likely lies somewhere between the two extremes.
When 0 <β i < 0.5, as can be seen, districts may prefer decentralization when the value of
η is large or the initial road speed v0 is low (bear in mind that η has an inverse relationship
with v0). As the road speed improves and value of η drops, the districts may switch to cen-Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212 203
Fig. 5 A numeric illustration of the endogenous choice of decision structure with the change in η in the
Citizen–Candidate model. A negative value of h(η) indicates policy centralization
tralization with an increasing need for coordination. The critical value of η is larger with a
higher value of βi.
Similarly, the value of governance choice function h(η) is calculated and plotted against
η in Fig. 5.A sF i g .5 displays, as η decreases, the function changes from a positive value
to a negative one, indicating that jurisdictions chose decentralization at the beginning, and
then switched to centralization as the road infrastructure improves and travel demand across
jurisdictions increases. A closer look at the numeric results discloses that the critical point
of η is around 0.872.
6 Endogenous shifts in governance choice
Both the Pigouvian Governments model and Citizen-Candidate model demonstrate how
governance choice could be made at a certain time point when road conditions and spillover
effects are treated as exogenous. More interestingly, as we will illustrate later, the gov-
ernance structure of a transportation system (in which the decision institution is chosen
and spending decisions made) and service conditions on infrastructure are endogenous to
each other in an evolutionary process of transportation development: as infrastructure im-
proves after spending projects are implemented, people’s traveling and spending preferences
change accordingly, which, in turn, will ﬁnd a way into the subsequent policy decisions
through a collective political system.20 In reality, as transportation investment projects are
20Besides infrastructure conditions, many factors, such as population growth, technological advance, and
induced demand, may inﬂuence spending decisions. Including these factors endogenously in our models,
however, is beyond the scope of this analysis.204 Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212
Table 2 A numeric example of
the coupled evolution of
infrastructure and the governance
structure in a sequential process
p r(p) v(p) η h(η) Centralized v(p+1)
0 5,000 35.000 0.946 0.191 No 39.781
1 5,750 39.781 0.925 0.106 No 40.366
2 6,613 40.366 0.923 0.098 No 43.022
3 7,604 43.022 0.911 0.067 No 44.923
4 8,745 44.923 0.903 0.049 No 47.319
5 10,057 47.319 0.892 0.030 No 49.668
6 11,565 49.668 0.882 0.014 No 52.210
7 13,300 52.210 0.872 −0.0005 Yes N.A.
approved and delivered in discrete planning periods, we would envision incremental im-
provements to infrastructure coupled with gradual, sequential changes in policy decisions;
when a critical point is reached, a spontaneous phase-shift of the spending structure will take
place, as we have observed in various transportation systems. This process is demonstrated
using a numeric example of the Citizen-Candidate model as follows.
Suppose that there are two local districts on a one-dimensional space with equal sizes
(L) of 20 kilometers and equal population of 100,000. Population is uniformly distributed
over the space with a residential density (r) of 5,000 persons per kilometer. We assume
that an average person generates 10,000 trips (k) from home in one planning period (say
10 years) and has a value of time (τ) of $10 per hour. A road crosses both districts with an
initial speed (v0) of 35 kilometers per hour. While ﬁxing the travel demand (k), we assume
that the population in both districts is growing exogenously at a constant rate of 0.15 for
each planning period. Finally, we arbitrarily specify the decline factor θ in the own-district
demand function as 10.0, and the values of the cost function coefﬁcients (αi, i = 0,1,2,3)
as 1,000, 1.25, 1.25, and 0.95, respectively. It needs to be noted that while the speciﬁed
values of the parameters capture some aspects of reality, they have not been calibrated with
empirical data. They are used only for the demonstration of the idea.
Simulation results are displayed in Table 2. For each planning period p the split of own-
district demand (η) is estimated according to the current population (r(p)) and road speed
(v(p)). The function of h(η) is then computed, and a centralized or decentralized spending
structure is adopted according to its score. Finally, policy decisions are made in the chosen
structure which, upon implementation, update the road speed for the next planning period
(v(p + 1)). As can be seen, in the beginning rounds the road service level (speed) is low
and travel is mostly intra-district (with η close to 1.0); a decentralized spending structure is
always chosen under which local governments make incremental improvements to their own
road segments. This lasts until the seventh consecutive planning period, when η reaches the
critical value of 0.872, and the spending power is shifted to the central government, as the
spillover effect becomes so prominent that the advantage of legislative decision making out-
weighs its inefﬁciency. Uncertainty subsequently arises regarding the updated road speeds
under centralized control, depending on elected representatives from which district will win
the majority and take over the decision power in the legislature.
7 Findings and concluding remarks
While transportation economists, public economists, and political scientists have examined
governance choice in the provision of public goods from different perspectives, this researchPublic Choice (2009) 141: 189–212 205
constructs a framework that accounts for the spatial, economic, and political dimensions of
infrastructure provision in a holistic process. In particular, we analyze governance choice
in a two-level federation in the provision of road infrastructure across geographically con-
nected jurisdictions. It is demonstrated, on a serial road network shared by two districts,
that residents’ preferences for public spending on road infrastructure are differentiated by
where they live and where they travel. A two-stage imperfect information game is then con-
structed to predict the choice of centralized or decentralized spending structure in a repre-
sentative democracy, and the correspondent spending decisions at either a central or a local
level.
This game is solved in two models that introduce different governmental decision-
making processes. While the Pigouvian Governments model considers simple Pigouvian
behavior of local and central governments, the Citizen-Candidate model explicitly intro-
duces political procedures at both a local and central level as follows:
Atalocallevel,residentsineachdistrictvoteforrepresentativesanddelegatetheirspend-
ing decision to elected representatives. Under the assumption of two-party politics and ma-
jority rule, elected representatives will commit to a policy position preferred by the median
voter. It is found that the location and preferred spending level of the median voter depends
on in-district travel demand; it is also found that elected representatives, in order to win a
majority in the election, tend to undersupply the infrastructure as compared to Pigouvian
local governments.
At a central level, it is assumed that spending decisions are made in a legislature of
locally elected representatives, where tradeoffs have to be made between the inefﬁciency
of non-cooperative legislative policy making and its advantage in terms of better addressing
spillovers across districts. It is shown in the two-district case that the inefﬁciency arises from
the uncertainty of identifying the winning coalition in the legislature, and the misallocation
of resources in favor of the home district of policy makers.
Both the Pigouvian Governments model and Citizen-Candidate model led to the ﬁnding
that a centralized or decentralized spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory com-
promise between beneﬁts and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes
at a certain time point, when road conditions and spillover effects are treated as exogenous.
From an evolutionary perspective, on the other hand, governance patterns and service condi-
tions on road infrastructure are endogenous to each other. It is demonstrated that governance
choice could be treated as a function of changes in infrastructure, and that endogenous shifts
in governance choice may take place when a tipping point of spillover effect is reached.
The goal of this study is to capture the essence of governance choice in a spatio-economic
context. In order to derive spending decisions in explicit analytic forms, we sacriﬁced some
realism by assuming a homogeneous travel demand over space and a non-cooperative legis-
lature in this analysis. This could be improved by introducing more realistic travel demand
forecasting and legislative decision-making processes.
The contributions of this study are several:
This research examines both individual and governmental decisions on road provision in
a holistic framework. While individual transportation decisions are made based on the costs
generated and the beneﬁts received from their recurring travel needs, governance choice and
governmental spending decisions are derived as a collective function of spatially differen-
tiated spending preferences of individuals in a democratic referendum system. Although it
has focused on the symmetric case with two identical districts, this analysis is generalizable
to examine multiple jurisdictions in an asymmetric situation, for which results may differ
signiﬁcantly. From a nominal perspective, this framework could be extended to evaluate the206 Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212
efﬁciency and equity associated with infrastructure provision at alternative institutional lev-
els, and examine how conﬂicting interests and regulatory efforts could be reconciled in a
mixed governance structure.
Our models are also useful to address contemporary transportation issues with govern-
mental involvement, such as project selection, congestion pricing, and “cap-and-trade.” Take
the transit line (“the Purple Line”) being proposed to connect Prince George’s County and
Montgomery County of Maryland as an example (Maryland Transit Administration 2009).
Controversies over whether this line is going to be built as a train or an express bus line
involve a dimension of economic, spatial, and political considerations, such as the distinct
construction costs associated with alternative proposals, the uneven distribution of job op-
portunities and travel needs across the two counties, and the uncertain splits of funding
sources from federal, state, and local governments. Our models provide a framework in
which these factors could be accounted for in an integrated political-economic process,
which existing models in public economics, transportation, and political science have to
treat separately. With empirical data available, extensions to our models could ﬁnd applica-
tions in explaining what actually happened or are happening in the real-world infrastructure
provision processes.
From an evolutionary perspective, this analysis points out governance structure is not
static in the infrastructure provision processes. The numerical simulation illustrates the idea
that as transportation infrastructure improves after incremental investments and technologi-
cal advance, the desired choice of governance may spontaneously switch from decentraliza-
tion to centralization when an endogenous tipping point of a shift is reached. This ﬁnding
corroborates the historical observation that the development of major transportation sys-
tems in the United States was usually accompanied with a centralizing tendency of deci-
sion power, and provides implications for policy issues, such as regulation, decentralization,
privatization, and road pricing from an innovative perspective of the coupled evolution of
infrastructure and institutional decision-making. Even in the absence of empirical data, this
research makes signiﬁcant theoretical advances over the formal models yet devised in the
literature that have no way of accounting for these endogenous changes in governance struc-
ture.
Appendix
8.1 Pigouvian governments model
On a one-dimensional space, it is easy to check the travel times that an individual resident
living at x needs to reach the centers of each district:




vi −L/2 ≤ x ≤ 0
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vi L/2 ≤ x ≤ L







With the assumption of ﬁxed demand, the total travel time an individual resident living






















vj )L / 2 ≤ x ≤ L
Assuming a uniform distribution of residents across space, we obtained the total travel












































A benevolent local government considers both resources cost (road spending) and user
cost (travel time cost) during decision making of road speed:
U
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The road speed chosen by a local government is obtained by taking the ﬁrst derivative of





















Under centralized decision making, it is assumed that the central government aims to
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Road speeds chosen for two districts can be obtained by taking the ﬁrst derivative of



























Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the spending policies at a central level is
skewed against district i (i.e., 0 ≤ βi ≤ 0.5). District j will beneﬁt from the misallocation at
the expense of district i. Therefore, if district i votes for centralization, district j will always









































































According to the assumption that uniform taxes are charged to ﬁnance road provision under
either centralized or decentralized decision making, the taxes that a resident needs to pay
can be calculated as:
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Under decentralized decision making, residents vote for a road speed that maximizes
their individual utility. The utility function of a resident takes the following form:
u
D



























0 (vi −v0)Lα3 L/2 ≤ x ≤ L
The favored speed of an individual resident can thus be derived by taking the ﬁrst deriv-




















L/2 ≤ x ≤ L
Note that whether a resident lives to the left or right of the district center, the preferred
road speed increases monotonically with the distance from residential location to the center.
Suppose that residents living at x− on the half farther from the border between two districts








In order to become a median voter, the median voter theorem suggests that there should
be half of the voters who prefer a road speed that is lower than the median-type road speed.
Based on the assumption of uniform distribution of residents across space, a median voter

































Under centralized decision making, it is assumed that representatives elected from dis-
tricts will form minimum winning coalitions in the legislature. Each coalition has equal
possibility to attract majority of the legislature.
Suppose that the representative from district i is selected to determine road spending
policy. It is assumed that the representative aims to choose spending levels for both districts210 Public Choice (2009) 141: 189–212
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Similarly, if the representative from district j wins the majority, the levels of road spend-

























As can be seen in either case, the policy maker tends to oversupply the road infrastructure
in his/her home district, and undersupply that in the neighboring district.
There is equal probability for the representative from district i and that from district j to
take the decision power in the legislature. Thus the expected utility function of an elected















































Policy centralization is adopted when both districts vote for centralization, thus the con-
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